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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the relationship between each asset type and the changes in 
amount of lending and credit creation before, during and after the financial crisis 
2007-2009 in Euro zone banks. The data are gathered from the Bankscope database 
and contains 354 banks from 19 Eurozone countries. This study uses fixed effect 
panel regressions to investigate the impact of different types of assets on lending 
ability of banks during the financial crisis 2007-2009. 
 
This study provides evidence that bank deposit and bank capital, both have positive 
relationship with bank lending during financial crisis. In other words, these two 
valuable types of asset can assist banks to continue to lend during the financial 
destress. In addition, bank capital has a positive relationship with bank credit creation 
during financial crisis. Thus, this study provides evidence that bank deposit and bank 
capital act as reliable sources of financing for Euro zone banks during financial 
turmoil. Furthermore, the results of the study show that liquidity risk has a greater 
influence on the large banks compare to smaller counterparts. 
 
 
 KEYWORDS: Bank liquidity, bank lending, bank credit creation, financial crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This research examines the effect of different types of assets on the amount of lending 
and credit creation in Eurozone banks during the financial crisis 2007-2009. Banks are 
deposit-taker financial institutions that make loans from the deposits and provide cash 
for depositors by transferring illiquid assets to the liquid assets, on demand. This 
scenario could work as long as depositors trust their banks. In situations when bank 
cannot meet the cash demand of depositors, for example when depositors lose their faith 
in their banks and demand for their deposits in a masse, banks have to sale their illiquid 
loans to meet the extra demand. This situation could lead the bank to bankruptcy. 
(Strahan 2012) 
 
Several studies try to explain the recent financial crisis from different views and 
dimensions. The reason is that the latest financial crisis (2008) was the greatest shock to 
the financial system since the great depression in 1930s, and therefore it requires a deep 
studying to understand the factors that lead to the disaster, and the ways to fix those 
factors. Many papers covered the banking crisis topic and involved factors; however, 
more studies are needed to search for the quality assets that helped the banks to survive 
the crisis, and risky holdings which put the banks in the list of crisis’s victims.  
 
Rising problems and climbing delinquency in the first quarter of 2007 were the first 
signs of financial distress. When Bear Sterns faced financial problems in summer 2007, 
US were sinking in the crisis. In the beginning Europe seemed to be safe from US 
financial turmoil, but soon the low interest rates and scarce liquidity, spread the problem 
to Europe and made European financial institutions to search for liquidity. Later the 
mortgage backed securities lost their values, and Lehman brothers (one of the leading 
investment banks of Wall Street) collapsed. Banks’ liquidity risk increased and financial 
system crushed. Central banks in respond to the equity needs of banks lowered the 
policy rates and supported the banking sector with the Trouble Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) in US and the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) in EU. (Liikanen 
2012).  At the end of 2008 world trade declined and the countries’ debt levels increased 
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as the result of supporting banking sector. The problem went further to Greece and then 
spread in PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) countries and Eurozone.  
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
This research examines the effects of different asset types on the level of lending and 
credit creation among Eurozone banks during the recent crisis. Several studies cover the 
bank lending and risk management in US during the recent financial crisis; however, 
few studies cover this issue for the European banks. This study aims to fill this gap for 
the Eurozone Financial Institutions. 
 
Banks in Eurozone hold significantly large sovereign debt. Thus, if one of the troubled 
countries cannot pay its debt the whole banking system of Euro area become insolvent. 
In addition, united currency, Euro, is the reason that spreads the problem from one 
country to the whole euro area and nation level tools lose their meaning in this matter. 
Therefore, whenever an economic problem arises in one of the Eurozone countries, it 
put the whole Euro area at risk. Compare to United States, Eurozone has a significantly 
larger banking system. Total assets of the banking system in Eurozone were over 300 
percent of the total GDP of the area; however, this amount was less than 100 percent for 
the banks in the United States. Moreover, firms in Eurozone rely on banking system for 
financing more than firms in US. (Shambaugh 2012) Therefore, bank performance in 
Europe requires an especial attention and more specific study, especially during the 
recent crisis time period. 
 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan and Tehranian (2011) test the effect of different types of 
holding assets on banks’ lending and banks’ performance during recent financial crisis 
in US. They found that core deposits and capital act as a reliable source of financing for 
banks during financial distress; however, undrawn commitments reduce the lending 
ability of banks during turmoil time (2007-2009).  
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
12 
 
The remained content of the thesis is organized as follows: Section two covers the 
literature review of the study with the focus on the relationship between liquidity risk, 
bank lending and bank credit creation, and different types of assets. Section three 
demonstrates the generic background of the study, including a summary of regulatory 
developments and theories of recent financial crisis. Section four introduces the 
theoretical background of the study with concentrating on the bank liquidity risk, bank 
lending and bank credit creation related theories. Section five, demonstrates the 
empirical tests, empirical hypothesis, data description, regression variables and 
empirical method. Finally, section six describes the empirical results and section seven 
provides the research conclusion. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section the most related literatures are summarized to help to get the better view 
of the different dimensions of liquidity risk exposures, loan supply and credit creation of 
banks. While several studies cover the bank lending and risk management in United 
States during the recent financial crisis, few studies cover this issue for the European 
banks. This section summarizes the most relevant studies about the relationship between 
each type of asset and liquidity risk, bank lending, and credit creation in individual 
subsections.  
 
2.1 Bank Liquidity Risk and Type of Assets 
 
Recent banking crisis made banks vulnerable to liquidity risk. In spite of a lot of 
regulations, especially in Euro area, banks faced a lot of challenges in order to 
overcome liquidity risk and in some cases they failed to survive. Liquidity risk refers to 
a type of risk that threatens the banks with low liquidity in their assets. In order to 
prevent liquidity risk banks should arrange their liquid assets on their balance sheet in 
the way that enable them to answer the demands (even unpredictable) for liquidity. 
There are two types of liquidity risk: First is day to day liquidity that refers to as the 
predictable liquidity. This type is the everyday demand of cash, which is the small 
percent of banks’ deposits. The other type is liquidity crisis. This type of risk is 
unpredictable and it refers to the time when customers demand their deposits in a mess. 
In this situation banks have to borrow funds in higher interest than market interest rate 
in order to supply the demand for cash. This situation may lead to disability of banks to 
meet their dues and may end up with bank failure.  
 
Banks transform the risk by exchanging the risky investments with the riskless ones. 
Banks reduce the risk by spreading the risk to different borrowers. In other words, banks 
are able to share the risk of lending by lending to the multiple borrowers, while the 
amount of liquidity creation and risk control may vary among different banks. (Berger 
& Bouwman 2009). Liquidity risk depends on the types of assets that banks hold. Some 
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assets can help the bank in liquidity creation especially during liquidity crisis, and some 
assets can make banks vulnerable to liquidity risk.  
 
In spite of some conflicts of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation in 
recent studies, Berger and Bouwman (2009) find a positive association between banks’ 
capital and bank’s ability to absorb the risk. The results show that banks’ capital 
increase the capacity of banks to tolerate the risk and this outcome is stronger for large 
banks compare to small banks.  
 
On the other hand, the study by Diamond and Rajan (2001b) argues that more equity 
capital can discourage the liquidity creation by making the capital less fragile. They 
state that fragile capital helps banks to make more loans; nevertheless, less fragile 
capital has a reverse effect. The reason could be addressed to banks’ monitoring ability, 
which increases by rising fragility. According to Gorton and Winton (2014) also, 
transposing the deposits by capital may have a negative effect on liquidity creation. 
However, this impact is not noticeable for big banks due to their access to the 
international capital markets. (Berger & Bouwman 2009) According to Diamond and 
Rajan (2001b) fragile capital allows the depositors to call back their deposits and also 
support the borrowers when they need liquidity. In addition fragile capital allows banks 
to fund themselves at a low cost.  
 
The main results of many studies show that the capital increases the chance of survival 
for the small banks and improves the performance in large banks during the crisis time. 
These studies state that it is more safe and efficient for banks to keep more capital 
during crisis, although it will affect their ability of lending. (Berger & Bouwman 2013, 
Diamond & Rajan 2001a) 
 
Banks can transfer liquidity risk by trading the deposits. Banks with lower deposits’ 
transaction have a higher stock return volatility with unused commitments, and when 
the liquidity become scarce, deposit lending hedge become stronger. (Gatev, 
Schuermann & Strahan 2009) Gatev, Schuermann and Strahan (2009) show that banks 
make combinations of transaction deposits and loan commitments to reduce the 
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liquidity risk to minimum. According to Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) banks make 
this combinations by using “risk management motivation”. They state that banks can 
decline their cash in order to supply both depositors and borrowers. This can happen if 
depositors’ demand and borrowers’ demand do not have high correlation. Moreover, 
Kashyap et al. (2002) find that there is a positive relationship between unused loan 
commitments and transaction deposits. 
 
Gatev et al. (2009) continue the study of Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) and show 
that banks’ liquidity risk increases by unused loan commitments and decreases by 
transaction deposits.  In  addition,  they  state  that  transaction  deposits  have  a  crucial  
role  in liquidity risk management, specifically during the financial distress. They also 
indicate that banks with high transaction deposits have lower risk than other banks in 
spite of high undrown loan commitments. According to recent studies, risk taking 
increases by lower level of lending costs in economy. (e.g Noeth & Sengupta 2012) 
 
Cornett et al. (2011) suggest that banks need cash and liquid assets to manage the 
liquidity risk. They also find the higher undrawn loan commitments, lead to the higher 
liquidity risk.  Furthermore, they find that credit supply decreased and liquid asset 
increased, as the result of greater liquidity risk exposures, during the recent crisis. In 
other words, banks had to decline their credits to make liquid assets in order to absorb 
the liquidity risk.  They conclude that banks, which were holding the assets with low 
market liquidity, had to increase their cash during crisis time. 
 
2.2 Bank Credit Creation and Type of Assets 
 
Bank credit is the amount of funds that bank is willing to give to an individual. Some 
type of assets can help the bank to continue to create credit during financial crises; 
however, some other type of assets can increase the credit risks for the banks. Credit 
risk is the risk of borrowers’ failure to meet their obligations. In other words, it is the 
risk of increasing in amount of non-performing loans for banks. Kapan and Minoiu 
(2013) state that banks with less capital made more cuts of credit supply during the 
crisis. According to them bank capital is necessary for recovering the credit after the 
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crisis, and they suggest that banks should raise the quality and quantity of this feature in 
their balance sheet. They further state that all these findings provide supports for the 
Basel III proposal framework as they found that strong balance sheets help banks to 
continue to create credit during financial crisis (2007-2009).  
 
Loan syndication can affect the credit supply during the recession with two possible 
scenarios: First, if banks hold larger share of loans that they created, then they have to 
decline the amount of loans they want to create during the recession. Second, if this 
amount of share reduces in respond to recession, then this increase in sharing risk can 
moderate the credit cycles. Syndicated loans allow banks to make loans with just 
keeping some proportion of them. Moreover, the bank receives an additional fee for 
lining up the syndication. (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010b) 
 
Cornett et al. (2011) test the effect of different types of holding assets on banks’ lending 
and banks’ performance during recent financial crisis in US. They found that banks’ 
liquidity management led to decline in the ability of credit supply. According to Bruno 
and Shin (2015) asset price and exchange rate can reduce the risk premium by 
improving households and firms’ balance sheet which affect both credit worth of the 
bank portfolio and quality of the bank portfolio. 
 
Hoque (2013) examines the various factors that affect the banking sector during the 
crisis. He divides the crisis into two parts: the credit crisis, and the sovereign debt crisis. 
He shows that banks with more regulatory capital and tangible equity performed better 
during the sovereign debt crisis; however, these two factors had a negative effect on 
bank performance during the credit crisis. Moreover, while loans play significant role in 
banking performance during the credit crisis, core capital was the better resource of 
financing during the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, funding fragility is the better 
explanatory variable in the credit crisis, while it does not explain the banking 
performance during the sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Hoque (2013) also shows that higher customer deposits led to a better performance 
during the sovereign debt crisis, but not in the credit crisis. He also states that Tier 1 
17 
 
capital results in higher risk for banks during the credit crisis; however, Tier 1 was a 
reliable source of funding during sovereign debt crisis. 
 
2.3 Bank Lending and Type of Assets 
 
Ivashina and Scharfstien (2010a) found that lending had a decreasing trend during the 
recent financial crisis and this trend is true for all types of loans. Some parts of this 
decline can be addressed to the drop in the loan demand of firms during the recession 
time and downward trend of interest rate. However, Ivashina and Scharfstien showed 
that there might be some effects on the supply side of this scenario. Ivashina and 
Scharfstien (2010a) state that unlike the decline in demand, decline in supply push up 
the interest rate and cause a noticeable fall in lending. They marked vulnerable banks 
according to two factors: First, the amount of short term debt to insured deposits, and 
then the drawdowns of the credit lines. Their analytical work suggest that banks, which 
faced more credit risk and less access to deposit, reduced their lending more than other 
banks. 
 
Berrospide (2013) finds that if banks forecast the losses in future, they will hold more 
liquid assets. Moreover, he states that the liquidity risk can be measure in both on and 
off balance sheet by measuring the security losses, investment portfolios and expected 
loan losses, as well as unused loan commitments. In addition, he indicates that the 
security and the loan losses are better measurements for the asset management risk. He 
also states that “precautionary motive” causes more than 25 percent of the decline in 
bank lending during recent crisis. Precautionary motive is the desire to hold cash in 
order to absorb the risk during the unexpected financial situations. When panic starts, 
banks stop lending to each other and start storing the liquid reserves. 
 
Berrospide (2013) also studies the effects of bank liquidity hoarding on bank lending 
during financial crisis (2006-2009). He finds that banks try to increase their liquidity in 
the periods that they forecast depreciation. Furthermore, he refers to loan loss reserves 
as another factor, which leads to increasing in amount of liquid assets in small banks.  
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Moreover, he suggests that there is an interbank circulation of core deposits for the 
banks, which decided to hoard the liquidity. His result indicates that banks, which 
hoarded, reduced their lending by 3-4 percent and he concludes that about 25 percent of 
reduction in bank lending is due to the liquidity hoarding. 
 
Cornett et al. (2011) suggest that stable sources of financing plays an important role for 
banks and make them less vulnerable during financial. Cornet et al. (2011) introduced 
core deposits and equity capital as reliable sources of financing, and suggest that banks 
with more core deposits and capital among their assets, could continue to lend during 
the financial turmoil. They also state that core deposit is more important for small banks 
compare to large ones. The more core deposits and equity capital banks had, the more 
was their lending ability during the recent crisis. In contrast, the more banks depend on 
the wholesale sources of debt financing, the less was their lending ability. Furthermore, 
liquidity risk of banks with more amounts of unused commitments increased during the 
financial turmoil. In addition there is a positive relationship between the liquidity risk 
and the liquid asset growth, and a negative relationship between the liquidity risk and 
the loan growth.  
 
According to Cornett et al. (2011) in order to absorb the liquidity risk banks increase 
their liquid asset, and decrease their lending amount. In other words, banks with less 
liquid assets increase their cash by cutting off the new commitments, loans and illiquid 
assets. In contrast, banks with stable sources of financing could survive and continue to 
lend during the crisis time.  
 
According to Disyatat (2011) banks with a certain amount of capital can absorb the 
small shocks and continue lending, which prevent from spreading the shocks into the 
economy. However, banks with the capital bellow the certain amount would reduce the 
lending level. Thus, Disyatat concludes that banks can act as an absorber of economic 
shocks depends on the amount of their capital in their balance sheet. 
 
Loan syndication can affect the credit supply during the recession with two possible 
scenarios: First, if banks hold larger share of loans that they created, then they have to 
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decline the amount of loans they want to create during the recession. Second, if this 
amount of share reduces in respond to recession, then this increase in sharing risk can 
moderate the credit cycles. Syndicated loans allow banks to make loans with just 
keeping some proportion of them. Moreover, the bank receives an additional fee for 
lining up the syndication. (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010b)  
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3. GENERIC BACKGROUND 
 
This section provides the generic background of the study regarding to the different 
regulations European Central Bank published in order to secure the banking system 
during the financial turmoil, the special structure of banking in European Union, and 
recent financial crisis and its effects on Eurozone banking.  
 
3.1 Regulatory Development 
 
European banks and financial intermediaries were affected by terms and regulations 
over the time. The History of Regulations are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1: History of Regulations in EU 
Year Regulations Details 
1957-1973 Deregulating Entry 
 
1977 First Banking Directives 
Harmonization of Banking 
Regulations 
1974 Establishment of Basel committee  
 
1988 
International Convergence of Capital 
Measurements and Capital standards 
(Basel I) 
Setting the minimum standard of 
capital adequacy in order to 
improve the international banking 
stability 
  
Introducing minimum for Tier 1 
and Tier 2 Capital 
  
introducing risk-weighted ration 
for assessing the capital adequacy 
  
introducing Target Standard Ratio 
2001-2005 The Financial Services Action Plan 
 
2006 Basel II Framework 
Calculation of Minimum Capital 
requirements for credit 
  
Introducing Risk Weighted Assets 
  
Introducing Capital requirements 
for Credit Risk 
  
Introducing the Operational Risk 
  
Defining the Market Risk 
2011 Basel III Framework Improves Basel I and Basel II 
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The Basel committee was stablished in 1974 with the aim of strengthen the European 
banking system. On 1988 this committee established their firs framework for banks. 
They introduced Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital, the former refers to the banks’ equity capital 
and the latter refers to the banks’ supplementary capital. They set a minimum value for 
each of these Tier 1 and Tier 2 in order to achieve the minimum capital adequacy by 
banks. Moreover, they introduced the risk-weighting system, which allows banks to 
carry low risk assets. In addition, the committee set a minimum standard ratio, which 
has been set to be 8 percent for capital to weighted risk assets. (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2015) 
 
The other framework by Basel committee has been established in 2006, Basel II, which 
introduces more comprehensive version compare with Basel I, while it includes the 
same key features of former framework. In addition to Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, this 
framework introduces Tier 3 capital in order to use to cover the market risks in short 
term debts. Moreover, 2006 framework introduced a modified approach to calculate the 
risk-weighted assets by banks. Basel committee also stated that banks are allowed to use 
their own approach for credit risk rating if the banks’ supervisor approves the method. 
Operational risk, which introduced in the 2006 framework, defined as risk of losses that 
arises from inadequate or failed internal processes that may lead to bank losses. Basel II 
also includes the market risk which defines as the on and off balance sheet losses in 
unstable market prices situation. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015) 
 
Basel III framework was published in June 2011, by Basel committee with the aim of 
improving in banking sector in order to absorb financial shocks and improve the risk 
management. It is the more straighten version of Basel II with the more emphasis on 
internal and external shocks. Furthermore, Basel III includes a conservation to make 
sufficient buffers in order to save the banking sector during the financial distress. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2011) 
 
The authorities defined two minimum standards in Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
(LCR) is for measuring the liquidity risk and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is 
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for measuring the maturity structure of assets. Recent financial crisis shows that 
banking system suffered from the lack of high quality capital during the financial 
distress, thus Basel III emphasis on the high quality capital. (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2011) 
 
In order to reinforce the capital treatment for the complicated securities “risk coverage” 
remark mentioned in the Basel III. According to this remark, banks are responsible to 
provide more accurate credit analyses subject to securitization disposal. In addition, this 
remark requires banks to provide more capital in order to trade, doing derivatives-
related activities and securitization in the trading book. Another aim of the “risk 
coverage” is to improve the credit risk of counterparts, thus it requires stricter exposure 
measuring and higher capital for exposures in the financial sector. (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2011) 
 
Another supplement of this remark requires banks to make capital buffers in non-
stressed periods (based on simple capital conservation rules), in order to minimize the 
losses during crisis period. Moreover, banks are required to rebuild these buffers, for 
instance by making a reduction in earnings or raise a new capital, in the case of draw 
down. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011) 
 
The aim of this remark is to alarm banks to consider about their macro-financial 
environment. This is another way of ensuring about adequate buffer for bank protection 
during the stress period. According to the “Leverage ratio” remark, banks are 
responsible to provide leverage in on balance sheet and off balance sheet. The Base line 
level of the capital to protect the safety net is the leverage requirement. (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2011) 
 
European banking authority set Basel III monitoring exercise on 30th of June 2011 and 
158 banks submitted their data for it. The results show that 48 banks had 100 percent 
coverage in this study. “Risk weighted assets” remark required banks to improve the 
quality and transparency, as well as quality of their capital in order to strengthen the 
capital ratio. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011) 
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3.2 Recent Banking Crisis 
 
Recent Financial crisis occurs within five stages: First US faced the Subprime crisis that 
occurs in 2007 to 2008. Before crisis US experienced an increase in amount of 
mortgage lending and as the result of this increase the housing prices climbed, so it was 
easy for borrowers to refinance their loans. Then the usage of mortgage-backed 
securities and collateralized debt obligations increased rapidly. Furthermore, the 
proportion of using the credit default swaps climbed. (Liikanen 2012) 
 
The first signs of the problem occurred during the first quarter of 2007 with the falling 
of the property prices. In the beginning Europe seemed to be secure from the turmoil but 
low interest rates and lack of liquidity, spread the problem into European Financial 
institutions and forced them to search for yields. Second stage of recent financial crisis 
named as “Systemic crisis” occurred during 2008, when the mortgage backed securities 
lose in their value and Lehman brothers’ collapse leaded to an increase in volatility. 
Banks’ liquidity and counterparty risk climbed and interbank money market faced a 
shutdown. (Liikanen 2012) 
 
Third stage is referring to as “crisis in economy” (2009-2010) the time when financial 
crisis spread into real economy, and world trade turned down. Loan losses raised, banks 
failed and needed urgent equity support. Central banks answer to this request by 
lowering the policy rates and supporting banks with extraordinary measures, such as 
TARP in US and LTRO in EU. (Liikanen 2012) 
 
Banks faced some difficulties to sell the loans in syndicated markets. Furthermore, the 
banks’ ability to supply liquidity eliminated. Banks experienced decreasing in capital 
and loan losses. Bear Stearns collapsed and sold to a very low price to J.P.Morgan 
Chase. U.S experienced the hugest bank failure after Washington Mutual broke down. 
The FDIC sold the assets and deposits after the losses to One West Bank and FSB. 
(Mishkin 2011) 
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The Federal Reserve increased its safety-net benefits to investment banks, and 
interrupted the commercial paper market. Moreover, Federal Reserve started to lending 
mortgage backed securities to banks in order to increase the banks’ capital over the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). In 2009, 140 banks failed in US and in spite of 
TARP program the small banks continued to fail even over 2010 at a high rate. 
(Mishkin 2011) 
 
Berrospide (2013) argues that banks kept the liquidity, provided by Federal Reserve, in  
the  form  of  reserves, instead  of  increasing  the  amount  of  lending. Moreover, 
Hancock and Passmore (2011) state that in the situation of high cost of capital and bank 
capital limitations, extra reserves were hoard by banks as excess reserves. Next stage 
includes Sovereign debt crisis when the debts of countries rose in addition to the 
recession. Greek faced the debt problem in April 2010 which made a new alarm for 
Europe and then financial tsunami transmitted to the Euro area. (Liikanen 2012) 
 
According to Shambough (2012) Eurozone faced multiple crises. Multiple crises are not 
unfamiliar term for economic world; however, in Europe, euro is not only the currency 
of troubled countries but also many countries located in Eurozone, which means that 
external debt influence on domestic currency and makes the Eurozone situation 
different and more complicated than Asian and Latin America crisis. In addition the 
debt obligations of the infected countries in Europe mostly held by other countries in 
Eurozone. 
 
Banks with poor economic performance experience non-performing loans and lower tax 
revenues. The nonperforming loans results in poor bank balance sheet and poor balance 
sheet affects the economic growth. Furthermore, Lower tax revenues put stress on the 
public finances. (Noeth & Sengupta 2012) Easy monetary policy, regulatory structure of 
the Europe and the asset price boom are three factors speeded the lending boom with 
higher risk taking in Europe. European banks borrow funds from US money markets 
and then invest them in other securities in US (shadow banking) for maturity 
transformation, and in order to increase this transformation they expand their balance 
sheets as well as the amount of leverage. There is a huge difference between the 
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European and US amount of leverage which is the result of various accounting 
standards or regulatory structure. Bruno and Shin (2015) states that this leverage ratio 
differences is because of adoption of Basel II by Europe which permitted European 
banks to expand their balance sheet rapidly. 
 
According to Bruno and Shin (2015) asset price and exchange rate can reduce the risk 
premium by improving households’ and firms’ balance sheet which affect both credit 
worth of the bank portfolio and quality of the bank portfolio. Introduction of euro has 
the same effect on risk premium by affecting sovereign and private debt, which leads to 
increasing in lending by making improvements in the loan portfolios. 
 
The European banks did not restrict their lending to the US banks. The introduction of 
euro made this opportunity for them to increase their lending inside and outside of 
Europe. There was a significant increase not only in capital inflows but also in asset 
prices in European banks which reached the peak around 2007-2008, the time of 
financial crisis in the US. 
  
According to Noeth and Sengupta (2012) credit booms cause increase in the loan 
defaults and a sharp decrease in the asset prices. This impact was stronger for European 
banks compare to the US counterparts during recent crisis. As European banks were not 
secured from rapid deleverage, they faced shortage in dollar and in order to provide 
additional liquidity they demand support of Federal Reserve and European central bank 
to open the swap lines for them.  
 
European banks use the wholesale dollar funding for deleveraging. Thus, when the 
wholesale dollar funding markets dried up, reducing leverage became more challenging 
for European banks. Therefore loan quality and asset prices declined; as the result their 
earning potential reduced significantly. Noeth and Sengupta (2012) indicate that 
European banks are more dependent on bank funding than the US banks. The reason is 
that US banks have access to capital markets, however, European banks rely on 
intermediate finance. Noeth and Sengupta (2012) show that deleverage difficulties has 
the greater effect on European banking sector compare to US counterparts. 
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There are some differences between the US banks and the banks in Europe. These 
differences made the financial situation worse in European banks during the financial 
crisis. Banks in Europe are larger than US banks in terms of GDP of the country. (In 
2007 total assets of banks in EU were 300 percent of the GDP of EU, while American 
banks hold approximately 100 percent of the GDP of the US). Moreover, in contrast 
with US banks, European banks are not union. Therefore unlike the US, where the 
regulations have demonstrated by Federal Reserve, regulations in Europe have indicated  
by  national  governments  and  central  banks  of  each  country, individually. 
(Shambaugh 2012) 
 
According to Shambaugh (2012) three crises occurred in Europe and affect the volatility 
and the currency union. First, “banking crisis”, that led to banks’ liquidity problems. 
Second, increasing bond yields, which led to “sovereign debt crisis”. Finally, the 
“macroeconomic crisis” that occurred when the economic growth slowed down. 
Shambaugh (2012) states that all these three crises are interlinked with each other and 
this intensify the crisis result. 
  
Sovereign debt holding of some countries in Europe is so large that supporting the failed 
banks leads to sovereigns’ failure. Furthermore, banks’ failure means lending reduction, 
which affects the economy growth. Weak economy growth again leads to sovereign 
debt crisis. (Shambaugh 2012) From another point of view, actions took in order to 
reducing the sovereign stress, worsen the economy growth and lead to damaging banks’ 
balance sheet, and this cycle will get worse and worse. 
 
In June 2011 recommendation for European banks to reach the specific capital adequacy 
(Basel III) published in order to improve the banks’ ability to survive during the 
financial crisis. In addition, on December 2011 European Central bank in respond to the 
banking equity needs lowered the policy rates and supported the banking sector with the 
Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO).  
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During the financial crisis when banks demand for the liquidity, European Central Bank 
(ECB) provides the long run refinancing operation for the European banks in order to 
prevent inter-bank lending and credit squeezing. (Noeth & Sengupta 2012) On 
December 2011, ECB provided low interest loans (1 percent interest) for the European 
banks and accepted the loans from their portfolio as collateral. LTRO provided loans for 
523 banks with the value of 489 billion Euros for three years with the rate of one 
percent. (Noeth & Sengupta 2012) 
 
The European Central Bank also provided some liquidity for the banks through main 
refinancing, with maturities of two weeks up to one month. Later ECB increased the 
length of maturity to three months until 2008, and six, twelve and thirty-six months 
since late 2011. Each of these new liquidity provisions supported the banks in Euro area 
especially in Ireland, Italy, Portuguese, Spain and Greece (PIIGS countries). (Noeth & 
Sengupta 2012) 
  
By providing these low interest loans ECB aimed to make enough liquidity for banks to 
pay their debt in the first quarter of 2012, and also to enable them to keep lending to 
businesses in order to prevent from economic shutdown. Moreover, ECB assumed that 
banks would spend some proportion of this liquidity on government bonds and it would 
have a positive effect on debt crisis. (Noeth & Sengupta 2012) On 29 February 2012, 
EBC took LTRO2 into the action and provided 529 billion Euros for 800 banks. (Noeth 
and Sengupta, 2012) According to Berrospide (2013) the liquidity provided by TARP, 
counterpart of LTRO program in US, hoarded by US banks and did not lead to 
increasing in lending, which was the aim of this program.  
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4. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Theoretical Background of the study put a magnifier over the recent theories about 
liquidity risk, credit supply and bank lending. Each concept will introduced and 
discussed shortly in this section. 
 
4.1 Bank Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity plays a significant role in banking system. There are three types of liquidity: 
Central bank liquidity, Market liquidity and funding liquidity. According to European 
Central bank “Liquidity in the economic literature relates to the ability of an economic 
agent to exchange his or her existing wealth for goods and services or for other assets”. 
Inability of this exchange refers to as illiquidity. Central bank liquidity refers to the 
ability of central banks to provide sufficient liquidity for financial system. According to 
ECB Market liquidity defines as “the ability to trade an asset at short notice, at low cost 
and with little impact on its price”. Last but not least, Funding liquidity refers to the 
ability of banks to meet their dues and liabilities. Liquidity risk refers to the probability 
of being illiquid. These three types of liquidity have liquidity linkages. (Nikolaou 2009) 
 
Figure 1: Liquidity Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Central Bank 
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Due to the liquidity risk linkage when a liquidity risk leak into the system, it will 
incorporate the whole financial system. Funding liquidity is in the heart of this system. 
Banks provide liquidity by intermediate between liquid short term funding and illiquid 
long term loans. In other words banks are the link between depositors and investors. 
Banks provide liquidity for the investors by lending them the short term deposits, which 
were provided by depositors. This action makes the banks fragile and vulnerable to 
liquidity risk, which is providing liquidity to the depositors on demand.  
 
One way to diminish this type of risk for banks is to hold enough liquid assets. 
However, banks are not willing to hold liquid assets due to the low returns. Therefore, 
banks have to choose a combination between high yield illiquid assets and low yield 
liquid assets. Banks can anticipate the demand of depositors to build this balance sheet; 
however, there is a situation when depositors decide to liquidize their deposits before 
the maturity. This situation is unpredictable for banks and they cannot satisfy the extra 
demand. This situation can put the banks at liquidity risk. Liquidity risk in one bank 
does not consider a problem unless this situation transmits to other banks and seize in 
interbank market. (Nikolaou 2009) 
 
Banks are linked by the joint market for liquidity. Failure of one bank shrinks the 
market liquidity, which all banks are commonly linked to it. As the result liquidity 
shortage for all banks is the outcome of this scenario. Market illiquidity can lead to the 
whole changes of asset prices, balance sheet sizes, and pricing. In this situation Central 
Bank begin to act as the supporter of the entire economy. Although Central Bank has 
the right to make emergency liquidity, it has several limitations. Central bank can 
temporary provides the needed liquidity, but the real cause of liquidity risk should find 
and the trouble should detect from the source. (Nikolaou 2009) 
 
Thus, the acts of Central Bank during the crisis could be important but not structural. 
However, in financial turmoil regulations and supervisions have crucial role. 
Supervisions and regulations can transfer the information evenly in the market and 
make a symmetric economy. (Nikolaou 2009) 
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4.2 Bank Credit Supply 
 
Bank credit refers to the funds that individuals or corporations can borrow from the 
bank. The credit derivatives market experienced a significant growth recently due to the 
customers demand for multiple credit cards. Credit is the total amount of fund a bank is 
willing to lend to an individual or an organization. Bank credit depends on two factors: 
The repay capacity of the borrower, and the available overall amount of credit in the 
bank. Some experts argue that financial crisis 2008 could be the alarm for easy to gain 
credit cards and suggest for more supervisions and obligations for credit supply, 
specifically for candidates with poor credit history. (Hirtle 2008) 
 
The most noticeable feature of the credit derivatives is that the origination, funding, and 
holding and management of the credit are separated from each other. This separation 
aids in distribution of the credit risk. In other words banks that originate the credit to 
other institutions transfer the credit risk to these institutions. Therefore institutions can 
be exposed to the credit risk without originate or fund any credit. From another point of 
view, banks use this credit diversification as a credit protection to supply more credit 
and increase lending. (Hirtle 2008) 
 
One of the most important banking risks is credit risk. Credit risk is the probability that 
the borrowers fail to meet their obligations and dues regarding to banks. In order to 
prevent from the credit risks managers should choose a logical combination of loans and 
securities. The diversify combination of these two can minimize the risk of credit lost 
for financial institutions. Loans are one of the riskiest assets on the balance sheet. Banks 
can lower their credit risk by allocate the higher return to the riskier assets. (Hirtle 2008) 
 
Figure 2, shows the changes in average credit risk from 2006 to 2012 for Eurozone 
banks. According to the graph credit risk start to increase from 2006, before the crisis, 
from almost 2 and continue an upward trend and reach above 6 in value in 2010, one 
year after the crisis, and then start to decrease to almost 3 in 2012. 
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Figure 2: Credit risk (2006-2012) 
 
Note: Average Credit risk is calculated from Total Loans/Total deposits formula. The data obtained from 
Bankscope. It includes 2006 to 2012 time period and data includes all banks of 19 Eurozone countries. 
 
 
4.3 Bank Lending 
 
Making loans is one of the primary ways that helps banks earn income. Banks lend the 
loans with higher interest rate that they received it as deposit from depositors and this 
difference provide yield for banks. Loans usually have fixed terms and fixed rate, due to 
the fact that if banks make the adjustable loans without penalty, then it would be 
difficult for banks to match this loan with their sources and it would increase the risk for 
banks. Loans typically are secured by banks’ properties. (Signoriello 1991) 
 
When there is a demand for the loan, banks check the credit history of the borrower and 
based on the type of demanded loan, poor or strong credit history, income evaluation 
and assets and debt evaluation of the borrower decide the amount of interest rate for the 
loan. Banks engage in many types of lending for example, mortgage loans, which is the 
type of loans for buying homes and properties, automobile loans, which is short with 
high rate and very profitable for the banks. The other type of loans is student loans, 
which is due to the high tuition fees of university especially in United States. The other 
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type of lending is credit card lending, which not all the banks engage in. This kind of 
loan has high interest rate because this kind of lending can be drawn at any time. 
(Signoriello 1991) 
 
Figure 3: Average Lending Amount (2006-2012)  
 
 
Note: Average loans are calculated from Total Loans data obtained from Bankscope. It includes 2006 to 
2012 time period and data includes all banks of 19 Eurozone countries. The numbers are in thousands 
Euros.  
Figure 3 shows the average amount of loans from 2006 to 2012, for 19 Eurozone 
countries. According to the table the amount of loans had lent by bank increased from 
2006 to 2007, before the crisis period. However, it remained steady from 2007 to 2008 
(beginning of the crisis) and then had the decreasing trend from 2008 to 2012, during 
and after the crisis. 
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5. EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
This section represents the main empirical tests used in this study. Main hypotheses of 
the study are explained and the data of the empirical part are represented. The models 
which are used in this study are discussed and the main variables are explained.   
 
5.1 Empirical Hypotheses 
 
The empirical hypothesis of this study constructed based on the previous related 
researches and their findings about banks’ asset types and asset types effects on bank 
lending and bank credit supply. In this section the summary of related studies are 
gathered and the main hypotheses are represented based on the previous results. 
 
 Bank capital and bank lending 
 
Ivashina and Scharfstien (2010a) investigate a study for relationship between deposits 
and lending and their analytical work suggest that banks with less access to deposit, 
reduced their lending more than other banks. In addition, Cornett et al. (2011) 
investigate a study about bank liquidity and credit supply, find that more core deposits 
and more equity capital assist the banks in continuing lending during the crisis period. 
Disyatat (2011) also indicates that banks with more capital are able to absorb the risks 
and continue lending during the financial turmoil. Overall, most of the studies suggest a 
positive relationship between bank capital and bank lending, and also bank deposit and 
bank lending; therefore, the first hypothesis of this study is formed as following: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Bank deposit and bank capital have positive relationship with bank 
lending during financial crisis. 
 
 Bank capital and bank credit 
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The second hypothesis about bank capital and bank credit creation is based on Kapan 
and Minoiu (2013) study. They suggest that bank capital is crucial for recovering the 
credit after the financial distress. Furthermore, Kapan and Minoiu (2013) investigate a 
study and find that banks with lower amount of capital made more reductions in level of 
their credit. Cornett et al. (2011) also find a positive relationship between bank core 
deposits and credit creation, and also bank capital and credit creation. Based on these 
findings the second hypothesis of this study is formed as following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Bank capital has a positive association with bank credit creation during 
financial crisis 
 
5.2 Data Description 
 
This study examines the effects of different asset types on bank liquidity, bank lending 
and bank credit creation, over the financial crisis period. This study used a fixed effect 
panel model with data gathered from 19 Eurozone countries consists of Austria, 
Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
Spain. The Euro currency is used for all data. The data is extracted from the Bankscope 
data base. All the banks with unavailable data are excluded from the sample. The used 
sample of banks consists of 354 banks, from 19 countries. This study covers 2006 to 
2012 time period, which includes pre-crisis period (2006), during the crisis period 
(2007-2009), and post-crisis period (2010-2012). 
 
In addition to banking data, macro-economic data have been used in this study consists 
of inflation, unemployment and GDP. Macro-Economic data are extracted from World 
Bank database. Banks have been divided into two groups according to bank size 
obtained from the Bankscope database, based on book value of the assets, as large and 
small banks. Large banks considered those banks with more than one billion Euros total 
assets, and small banks are those with less than one billion Euros. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of sample banks by year and total number of each type regarding to the 
periods, before, during and after crisis. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Sample 
Period Year Small Large Total Total Small Total Large 
Before the Crisis 2006 246 108 354 246 108 
  2007 243 111 354     
During the Crisis 2008 239 115 354 717 345 
  2009 235 119 354     
  2010 228 126 354     
After the Crisis 2011 226 128 354 675 387 
  2012 221 133 354     
 
Note: The number of banks analyze between 2006 and 2012. The banks are divided into two groups of 
large and small banks. Large banks include banks with total asset more than 1 billion Euros and Small 
group include the banks with total asset less than 1 billion Euros at the start of each year. Total asset size 
is collected from Bankscope. 
 
Table 3 shows variables that used in this study, variable classification, description and 
the source which the variable obtained. All dependent variables and bank control 
variables are calculated, based on the data obtained from the Bankscope database. 
Moreover, all Marco-economic control variables are obtained from World Bank 
database. 
 
Table 3: Sample Variables 
Classification Variable description Source 
Dependent Variables ∆Liquid Assets/Assets ∆Liquid asset ratio Calculated 
 
∆Loans/Assets ∆Loan ratio (t) Calculated 
 
∆Credit/(Commit+Assets) ∆Loan commitment ratio (t) Calculated 
Bank Control 
Variables 
Illiquid Assets/Assets Illiquid asset ratio Calculated 
 
Commit/(Commit+Assets) Loan commitments ratio Calculated 
 
Deposits/Assets core deposit ratio Calculated 
 
Capital/Assets equity capital ratio Calculated 
 Log Assets Bank Size Calculated 
Macro Control 
Variables 
GDP GDP Growth Rate World Bank 
 
Unemployment Unemployment Rate World Bank 
 
Inflation Inflation World Bank 
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5.3 Regressions Variables 
 
The empirical part of the study investigates the relationship between the different type 
of asset holding by banks, and bank liquidity, bank lending and bank credit creation. 
∆Liquid Assets/Assets, ∆Loans/Assets, and ∆Credit/(Commit+Assets) are dependent 
variables and Illiquid Assets/Assets, Commit/(Commit+Assets), Deposits/Assets, 
Capital/Assets are the asset types this study investigated. In continue the definition and 
expected sings of the variable are discussed.  
 
 Dependent Variables 
The amount of liquidity changes is calculated by ∆Liquid Assets/Assets (liquid asset 
ratio). Liquid assets of bank for each year are distracted from bankscope, changes from 
the previous year are calculated and divided by total asset of the same year. The amount 
of changes in lending is calculated by ∆Loans/Assets. Amount of loans for bank 
extracted for every year from Bankscope database and the changes from the previous 
year is calculated and then divided by the total assets. The amount of credit creation is 
calculated by ∆Credit/(Commit+Assets). Credit calculated from the aggregate amount 
of committed credit lines and loans, obtained from Banckscope. The changes of credit 
from previous year is calculated and divided by the aggregate of committed credit lines 
and total assets.  
 
 Bank Control Variables 
Capital/Assets and Deposits/Assets are the major control variables. Based on previous 
studies, positive relationship between amount of deposits and capital is expected with 
amount of bank lending. In other words, banks with higher level of deposits and capital 
are expected to have greater level of lending during financial crisis. Based on previous 
findings, a positive association is expected between amount of deposits and capital, and 
amount of bank credit creation. In other words, banks with higher level of deposits and 
capital are expected to create higher level of credit during financial crisis. 
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 Different studies report the different relationships between liquidity and asset types e.g. 
capital, deposits, etc.). Therefore, this study investigates on this relationship without 
considering any expected sign. The other control variables are Illiquid Assets/Assets 
and Commit/(Commit+Assets), the negative sign is expected for relationship between 
illiquid assets and amount of liquidity. And a negative relationship between 
Commit/(Commit+Assets) and liquidity. Log Assets is the other bank control variable 
which control for the bank size. 
 
 Macroeconomic Control Variables 
Due to the different size of the countries included in the study, Inflation, GDP and 
unemployment are included to control for the macroeconomic effects in the models. 
 
5.4 Empirical Method 
 
As it is impossible to consider that all the observations are distributed independently 
over the time, this study uses the fixed effect panel regression in order to minimize the 
effects of unbiased explanatory variables. Three regressions are used in this study 
formulated as follow: 
 
1. ∆Liquid 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1= 𝑇𝑡1 + ß1𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  +  ß2𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
+ ß3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + ß
4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡/(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + ß
5𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
2. ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1= 𝑇𝑡
2 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝛾
2𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛾3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾
4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡/(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾
5𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
3. ∆𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡/(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1= 𝑇𝑡
3 + 𝜆1𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1  +  𝜆
2𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠/
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆
3𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆
4𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡/(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆
5𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 
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First regression model tests how banks adjust their liquid assets during the financial 
crisis. Second regression estimates the bank lending changes over the crisis period and, 
the last regression tests the credit changes in the banking system. During the financial 
crisis banks lowered their amount of lending compare to before crisis period in order to 
increase their liquidity level. If capital and deposits act as reliable source of funding for 
banks 𝛾2 and 𝛾3  are expected to be positive. The reason is that banks with greater level 
of deposits and capital would perform better during the distress time. In addition if 
capital and deposits aid banks in credit creation during the crisis, then  𝜆2 and 𝜆3 are 
expected to be greater than zero, as well. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section empirical result of the study is represented. First the descriptive statistics 
of the total data is presented. In addition to total data, the descriptive statistics of the 
dependent variables of the model are presented for each examined period (before the 
crisis, during the crisis and after the crisis). Moreover, the results of the regressions are 
presented over the total time period of 2006 to 2012 for all banks. Furthermore, the 
result for regressions are presented and explained for separate time periods, 2006, 2007 
to 2009, and 2010 to 2012. Further in this section the result of credit creation 
investigation reported for four different bank sizes (Large, medium, small and smallest) 
and explained in details. Last but not least, the results of all three regressions are 
reported and explained for two bank groups (large with assets more than 1 billion Euros 
and small with assets less than 1 billion Euros), in order to investigate all aspects of the 
topic from different dimensions.  
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 represents the descriptive statistics of all data used in the regressions for all 
banks during the whole period of 2006 to 2012. Table 5 shows the summary statistics of 
selected financial items for all banks regarding to bank size and sub periods. This table 
provides summary statistics for changes in liquid assets, loans and credit, during 2006, 
before crisis period, 2007 to 2009, during crisis period, and 2010 to 2012, after the crisis 
period. The banks are divided to small and large group .Small banks have the total 
assets up to 1 billion Euro and large banks have the total assets higher than 1 billion 
Euros. 
 
Compare to before crisis period (2006), during crisis period (2007-2009) has the lower 
mean and median for both changes in loans and credits for both large and small bank 
groups. This can be explained by lower amount of bank lending and bank credit creation 
during the financial crisis. 
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Table 4: Summary statistics for all variables 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Illiquid Assets/Assets 0.671 0.705 0.990 0.008 0.166 
Deposits/Assets 0.485 0.483 0.904 0.001 0.146 
Log Assets 5.888 5.697 9.097 4.511 0.792 
Capital/Assets 0.100 0.094 0.499 0.007 0.041 
Commit/(Commit+Assets) 0.033 0.023 0.693 0.000 0.036 
∆Liquid Assets/Assets -0.002 0.000 0.503 -1.353 0.071 
∆Loans/Assets 0.037 0.038 0.623 -5.081 0.122 
∆Credit/(Commit+Asset) 0.033 0.037 0.718 -6.431 0.153 
GDP -0.132 0.587 19.482 -8.864 3.054 
Inflation 1.740 1.899 20.295 -3.916 1.036 
Unemployment 7.876 7.789 24.200 3.000 1.679 
Note: ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-
(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit /(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit 
lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= 
capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , 
DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 
, LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from 
World Bank website. 
 
For large banks the mean and median of changes in ∆Loans/Assets before crisis are 
0.071 and 0.069 respectively, while those measures are 0.006 and -0.001 for the crisis 
period. Nevertheless mean and median of lending for large banks are at their least 
amount after the crisis period (2010-2012) with -0.007 and 0.009 values, respectively. 
The mean (median) of changes in ∆Credit/(commit+Asset) for large banks are 0.074 
(0.071) and 0.039 (0.047) before the crisis and during the crisis respectively. This value 
is -0.015 (0.007) for after the crisis period. 
 
The mean (median) of ∆Loans/Assets for small banks is 0.072 (0.067) for before the 
crisis quarters, however; this value 0.056 (0.054) and 0.020 (0.016) for during and after 
the crisis quarters, respectively. The mean (median) of changes in 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) for smalls banks are 0.072 (0.069) and 0.053 (0.052) before 
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the crisis and during the crisis respectively. This value is -0.017 (0.014) for after the 
crisis period. 
 
Table 5: Summary statistics of the banks’ financial items over 2006 to 2012 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std.d 
Panel A: Large banks during 2006 
     
∆Liquid Assets/Assets 0.076 0.008 6.438 -0.195 0.621 
∆Loans/Assets 0.071 0.069 0.381 -0.193 0.071 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 0.074 0.071 0.372 -0.190 0.071 
      
Panel B: Small banks during 2006 
     
∆Liquid Assets/Assets 0.000 0.001 0.503 -0.321 0.058 
∆Loans/Assets 0.072 0.067 0.444 -0.036 0.048 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 0.072 0.069 0.259 -0.170 0.050 
      
Panel C: Large banks during 2007- 
2009     
∆Liquid Assets/Assets -0.006 -0.001 0.499 -1.353 0.119 
∆Loans/Assets 0.043 0.045 0.345 -0.511 0.071 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 0.039 0.047 0.352 -0.495 0.079 
      
Panel D: Small banks during 2007-
2009      
∆Liquid Assets/Assets 0.001 0.002 0.236 -0.335 0.051 
∆Loans/Assets 0.056 0.054 0.423 -0.227 0.051 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 0.053 0.052 0.718 -1.916 0.094 
      
Panel E: Large banks during 2010-
2012      
∆Liquid Assets/Assets -0.009 -0.004 0.403 -0.444 0.077 
∆Loans/Assets -0.007 0.009 0.623 -5.081 0.272 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) -0.015 0.007 0.629 -6.431 0.338 
      
Panel F: Small banks during 2010-
2012      
∆Liquid Assets/Assets -0.005 0.000 0.384 -0.434 0.054 
∆Loans/Assets 0.020 0.016 0.306 -0.471 0.052 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 0.017 0.014 0.313 -0.467 0.055 
 
Notes: ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , 
∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit /(commit+Asset) =(committed credit 
lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent 
variables. 
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The mean (median) of ∆Liquid Assets/Assets for large banks is 0.076 (0.008) before the 
crisis time zone, while it is -0.006 (-0.001) during the crisis, and it is -0.009 (-0.004) 
after the crisis period. The mean (median) of ∆Liquid Assets/Assets for small banks is 
0.000 (0.001) in before the crisis period, but 0.001 (0.002) during the crisis period, and -
0.005 (0.000) after the crisis timeline. 
  
6.2 Empirical Results 
 
Table 6 shows the result of three regressions for all banks during 2006 to 2012 time 
period. The results suggest that core deposits are positively and highly correlated to both 
∆Loans/Assets and ∆Credit/(commit+Asset), meaning that core deposits were the stable 
source of funding during the recent financial crisis. Moreover, the results show that 
capital is also positively and highly correlated to both ∆Loans/Assets and 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) demonstrates that core deposits also act as a reliable source of 
funding during the financial distress. Those banks with higher level of core deposit and 
capital did better to overcome their liquidity risk according to the empirical results. 
These results are proof for both hypotheses in this study. These results support the 
Cornett et al. (2011) findings that core deposit and capital assist banks when financial 
turmoil happen. There is a positive highly significant relationship at 1% level between 
unused commitments and ∆Loans/Assets. It represents that banks with higher level of 
commitments have a greater loan demand and this finding is also a support for Cornett 
et al. (2011) results. 
 
The relationship between capital and ∆loans is positively highly significant at 1% level, 
which supports the findings of Cornet et al. (2011) and Disyatat (2011), who observed a 
significant positive relationship between bank deposits and amount of lending in their 
researches. In addition, capital also has a positive relationship with changes in liquid 
assets and credit which is significant at 1% level. These results are proof for the findings 
of Kaplan and Minou (2013); however, these results are against the findings of Hoque 
(2013), who states that capital has a negative effect on bank performance during the 
credit crisis.  
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The relationship between unused commitments and ∆Loans/Assets and 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) are both positively highly significant at 1% level. It supports 
the Cornet et al. (2011) result that shows the positive relationship between loans and 
unused commitments, while is against the negative sign that they find for the association 
between unused commitments and credit changes. The relationships between core 
deposits and changes in loans and credit are positive and statistically highly significant 
at 1% level, which is a proof to the findings of Ivashina and Scharfstien (2010a). The 
relationship between illiquid assets and ∆Liquid Assets/Assets shows the negative sign 
and is significant in 1% level. 
 
Table 6: Results of Regressions (2006-2012) 
 
∆Liquid Assets/Assets ∆Loans/Assets 
∆Credit/ 
(commit+Asset) 
CAPITAL_ASSET 0.335*** 0.549*** 0.644*** 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010) 
COMMIT 0.102 0.342*** 1.309*** 
 
(0.108) (0.001) (0.000) 
DEPOSIT_ASSET -0.033 0.183*** 0.228*** 
 
(0.271) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.237*** 0.341*** 0.279*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INFLATION 0.005** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOGASSETS 0.227*** 0.399*** 0.476*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.004*** -0.016*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2478 2478 2478 
R-squared 0.157 0.318 0.304 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-
(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit 
/(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit 
lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= 
committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer 
deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm 
of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. P-values are 
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reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
The relationship between illiquid assets and loan and credit changes shows the positive 
sign and statistically significance at 1% level. The size of the banks (Logassets) shows 
the positive sign in relationship with all three dependent variables. In addition, all macro 
variables have significant relationship with all three dependent variables at 5%-1% 
level. Unemployment shows the negative sign with all three dependent variables; 
however, GDP and inflation have positive association with dependent variables. This is 
the proof that all macro-economic factors play significant roles in this model and have 
significant impact on banks during the financial crisis. These results are general for the 
whole period, and in following sections in the study the specific results for each sub-
period with regards to the bank-size will be discussed. 
 
6.2.1 Effects of Different Assets before the Financial Crisis 
 
The three regressions in this study have been ran for data belong to before the crisis 
period (2006), during the crisis period (2007-2009) and after the crisis time (2010-2012) 
separately, in order to estimate the effect of each asset type on ∆Liquid Assets/Assets, 
∆Loans/Assets and ∆Credit /(commit+Asset) during each time period. The results are 
reported in table 7, table 8 and table 9. 
 
According to table 7 capital has the significant positive relationship with ∆Liquid 
Assets/Assets before the crisis, however, no significant relationship is reported between 
capital and two other dependent variables. This is the proof that capital can help the 
banks to provide liquidity and assist them when the liquidity is scarce. Unused 
commitments have significant positive relationship with both ∆Loans/Assets and 
∆Credit /(commit+Asset) at 10% and 1%, respectively. The relationship between 
unused commitments and changes in credit is higher and more significant. The 
relationship between core deposit (DEPOSIT_ASSET) and ∆Liquid Assets/Assets is 
negative and highly significant at 1% level, however, the relationship between core 
deposits and ∆Credit /(commit+Asset) is positive and again highly significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table 7: Regressions Results, period (2006) 
 
∆Liquid 
Assets/Assets 
∆Loans/ 
Assets 
∆Credit/ 
(commit+Asset) 
CAPITAL_ASSET 0.304*** 0.005 -0.066 
 
0.000 0.948 0.346 
COMMIT -0.126 0.126* 0.296*** 
 
0.108 0.081 0.000 
DEPOSIT_ASSET -0.084*** 0.021 0.052** 
 
0.000 0.304 0.011 
GDP -0.002 -0.006** -0.007*** 
 
0.456 0.027 0.010 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.116*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
INFLATION 0.008* 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 
0.096 0.000 0.000 
LOGASSETS 0.018*** 0.004 0.002 
 
0.001 0.365 0.678 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.002 0.003 0.005 
 
0.713 0.453 0.235 
Observations 354 354 354 
R-squared 0.204 0.234 0.250 
 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-
(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit 
/(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit 
lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= 
committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer 
deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm 
of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. P-values are 
reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
 Illiquid assets have significant relationship with all three dependent variables at 1% 
level. This relationship has negative sign with changes in liquidity and positive sign 
with changes in both loans and credit. Macro variables (GDP and inflation) show the 
significant relationship with dependent variables specially with ∆Credit 
/(commit+Asset) and ∆Loans/Assets; however, unemployment does not show any 
significant association with dependent variables before the crisis. 
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6.2.2 Effects of Different Assets during the Financial Crisis 
 
Table 8 shows the result of three regressions during the financial crisis (2007-2009). 
According to the table, capital has a positive significant relationship with changes in 
loans, significant at 10% level. Thus again this is the proof that capital has a crucial role 
for enabling banks to continue lending during financial distress. Committed credit lines 
(COMMIT) also shows a significant positive association with ∆Credit/(commit+Asset) 
at 1% level. This finding shows that instead of credit creation (credit supply) the 
demand of credit increased during the recent crisis.  
 
Table 8: Regressions Results, period (2007-2009) 
 
∆Liquid 
Assets/Assets 
∆Loans/Assets 
∆Credit/ 
(commit+Asset) 
CAPITAL_ASSET 0.025 0.371* 0.529 
 
0.941 0.064 0.117 
COMMIT 0.096 -0.030 1.836*** 
 
0.376 0.644 0.000 
DEPOSIT_ASSET 0.065 0.132*** 0.190** 
 
0.430 0.007 0.021 
GDP 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.008 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.437*** 0.461*** 0.327*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
INFLATION 0.000 0.011*** 0.007 
 
0.939 0.001 0.210 
LOGASSETS 1.022*** 0.437*** 0.439*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.004 -0.007 -0.010 
 
0.643 0.133 0.204 
Observations 1062 1062 1062 
R-squared 0.426 0.619 0.545 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-
(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets= (loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/assets)𝑡−1 and 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed 
credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , 
COMMIT= committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total 
customer deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural 
Logarithm of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. P-
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values are reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Deposits also has a significant positive relationship with both ∆Loans/Assets and 
∆Credit /(commit+Asset) at 1% and 5%, respectively, showing that core deposits and 
capital play the important role as reliable sources of funding and helped banks the most 
to continue lending and making credit during the financial crisis. Illiquid assets show 
the significant relationship with all three dependent variables at 1% level. This 
relationship is negative with changes in liquid assets and positive with changes in loans 
and credit. Bank size (logassets) shows the positive significant association with all three 
dependent variables at 1% level. GDP has positive relationship with all three variables 
at 1%, while unemployment does not show any significant relationship in these 
regressions. Inflation has a positive significant relationship with changes in loans at 1% 
level. 
 
6.2.3 Effects of Different Assets after the Financial Crisis 
 
Table 9 presents the results of three regressions in after the crisis period (2010-2012). 
According to this table capital has a significant relationship with all three dependent 
variables at 1% level. Capital has a negative association with changes in liquid assets, 
whereas its relationship with changes in loans and credit has positive sign. Illiquid 
assets also have negative relationship with both ∆Loans/Assets and 
∆Credit/(commit+Asset), fairly high and significant at 1% level. This shows that banks 
with more illiquid assets had to cut down on lending and credit supply after the crisis. 
Committed credit line (COMMIT) shows a significant positive association with changes 
in credit at 5% level. 
 
In table 9 the association between Capital and ∆Liquid Assets/Assets is negative and 
highly significant at 1% level shows than banks with greater capital level have 
advantage to deal with liquidity buffers. In addition its significant positive relationship 
with ∆Loans/Assets and ∆Credit/(commit+Asset) indicates that capital was a reliable 
source of funding for banks to continue lending and produce credit even after the crisis. 
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Table 9: Regressions Results, period (2010-2012) 
 
∆Liquid 
Assets/Assets 
∆Loans/Assets 
∆Credit/ 
(commit+Asset) 
CAPITAL_ASSET -0.941*** 3.099*** 3.849*** 
 
0.003 0.000 0.000 
COMMIT 0.118 0.021 1.346** 
 
0.517 0.966 0.024 
DEPOSIT_ASSET 0.057 0.108 0.162 
 
0.272 0.433 0.345 
GDP 0.006* -0.005 -0.003 
 
0.081 0.612 0.814 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.077 -0.452*** -0.776*** 
 
0.197 0.004 0.000 
INFLATION 0.007 -0.021* -0.015 
 
0.150 0.097 0.334 
LOGASSETS 0.318*** 0.085 0.043 
 
0.000 0.577 0.821 
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.006 -0.012 -0.012 
 
0.119 0.239 0.360 
Observations 1062 1062 1062 
R-squared 0.413 0.425 0.417 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-
(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit 
/(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit 
lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= 
committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer 
deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm 
of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. P-values are 
reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
 
6.2.4 Credit Production across Different Bank Size 
 
Economic magnitude of different types of assets in credit production has been estimated 
in table 10. The third regression has been tested for four bank sizes: Large banks with 
total assets more than 1 billion Euros, Medium-sized banks with total assets between 
500 million and 1 billion Euros, Small banks with total assets between 100 million and 
500 million Euros and Smallest banks with total assets lower than 100 million Euros. 
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Table 10 shows the perfect evidence that liquidity risk has a greater influence on the 
larger banks. All the variables are greater and most of them are statistically highly 
significant at 1% level for large banks, compare to other bank-size. Credit changes has a 
negative relationship with capital which is significant at 5% level, in smallest banks; 
however, capital does not have any significant relationship with credit creation in other 
bank sizes.  
 
Table 10: Effect of different types of assets on credit production 
  
Large  
banks   
Medium 
banks   
Small 
 banks   
Smallest 
banks  
CAPITAL_ASSET 0.771 
 
0.001 
 
-0.258 
 
-1.025** 
 
 
0.247 
 
0.998 
 
0.364 
 
0.026 
COMMIT 2.038*** 
 
0.766*** 
 
1.210*** 
 
0.468** 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.017 
DEPOSIT_ASSET 0.290** 
 
0.179** 
 
0.130** 
 
0.073 
 
 
0.028 
 
0.043 
 
0.019 
 
0.263 
GDP 
 
0.006** 
 
0.001 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.002 
 
 
0.020 
 
0.323 
 
0.002 
 
0.281 
ILLIQUIDASSETS 0.939*** 
 
0.166** 
 
0.179*** 
 
0.160** 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.021 
 
0.002 
 
0.033 
INFLATION 0.014* 
 
0.013** 
 
0.009** 
 
-0.014** 
 
 
0.067 
 
0.025 
 
0.015 
 
0.032 
LOGASSETS 1.115*** 
 
0.092 
 
0.156*** 
 
-0.223** 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.358 
 
0.007 
 
0.024 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.019*** 
 
-0.012*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.008** 
  
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.048 
Number of banks 840 
 
395 
 
1039 
 
204 
R-squared 0.484 
 
0.580 
 
0.361 
 
0.421 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Credit /(commit+Asset) =(committed credit 
lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 is dependent 
variable. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= committed credit lines/(committed credit 
lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= 
Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm of total assets. GDP, Inflation and 
Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. Large banks (Total assets> 1 billion Euros), Medium 
banks (total assets 500 million to 1 billion Euros), Small banks (Total assets 100 million to 500 million 
Euro), Smallest banks (total assets < 100 million Euro). P-values are reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** 
and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Committed credit lines have positive relationship with all bank sizes which is significant 
in 5% to 1%, while it is higher for large banks and the least for the smallest banks. 
Deposits have the positive relationship with credit changes in all bank sizes and this 
relationship increases when the bank size grows. Illiquid assets also show significant 
positive relationship with credit creation in all bank sizes; however, this association is 
the highest for large banks and lowest for the smallest banks. GDP, inflation and 
unemployment, all have higher association with bank credit creation when the size of 
the banks grows. 
 
6.2.5 Effects of Different Financial Assets across Bank Size 
 
Table 11 represents the result of all three regressions on small and large bank sizes. 
Banks ae divided in two groups of large banks with total assets more than 1 billion 
Euros, and small banks with total assets of lower than 1 billion Euros. According to 
table 11, committed credit lines (COMMIT) have higher influence on loan changes in 
large banks compare to small banks; however, they have higher influence on changes in 
credit in small banks compare to large banks. In other words, large banks with higher 
committed credit lines could continue to lend more loans than other large banks with 
lower amount of committed credit lines. While this statement is still true but in lesser 
extend for small banks.  
 
There is a positive relationship between deposit and credit creation in large banks and it 
is significant at 5% level. There is also a positive relationship with slightly higher 
coefficient between deposit and credit creation in small banks, significant at 1% level. 
In addition small banks’ capital also shows the negative and positive coefficients with 
∆Liquid Assets/Assets and ∆Loans/Assets, respectively. Illiquid assets show a negative 
relationship (significant at 1% level) with changes in liquid assets in both large and 
small banks. However, the relationship between illiquid assets and changes in loans and 
credit is positive and significant at 1% level for both bank sizes. 
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Table 11: Result of regressions on small and large banks. 
 
∆Liquid 
Assets/Assets  
∆Loans/Assets 
 
∆Credit/ 
(commit+Asset) 
      Panel A : Large banks ( total assets> 1 billion Euro) (N=840) 
 CAPITAL_ASSET 0.057 
 
0.407 
 
0.665 
 
0.865 
 
0.455 
 
0.247 
COMMIT 0.177 
 
1.063*** 
 
0.285*** 
 
0.214 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
DEPOSIT_ASSET -0.060 
 
0.164 
 
0.132** 
 
0.364 
 
0.130 
 
0.028 
GDP 0.007*** 
 
0.005** 
 
0.003** 
 
0.000 
 
0.018 
 
0.020 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.261*** 
 
0.865*** 
 
0.112*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
INFLATION 0.007* 
 
0.012* 
 
0.008* 
 
0.078 
 
0.060 
 
0.067 
LOGASSETS 0.232*** 
 
0.898*** 
 
0.088*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.003 
 
-0.020*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
0.226 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
      Panel B : Small banks ( total assets< 1 billion Euro) (N=1638) 
CAPITAL_ASSET -0.167 
 
0.071 
 
-0.160 
 
0.236 
 
0.551 
 
0.389 
COMMIT -0.015 
 
0.106** 
 
1.141*** 
 
0.798 
 
0.032 
 
0.000 
DEPOSIT_ASSET -0.049* 
 
0.145*** 
 
0.142*** 
 
0.090 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
GDP -0.001* 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.091 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
ILLIQUIDASSETS -0.243*** 
 
0.264*** 
 
0.195*** 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
INFLATION 0.001 
 
0.008*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
0.602 
 
0.000 
 
0.002 
LOGASSETS 0.059* 
 
0.145*** 
 
0.157*** 
 
0.051 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
UNEMPLOYMENT -0.003 
 
-0.014*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
0.056 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Note: Fixed effect panel least square is used as estimator. ∆Liquid Assets/Assets= (Liquid Assets)𝑡-
(Liquid Assets)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 , ∆Loans/Assets=(loans)𝑡-(loans)𝑡−1/ assets)𝑡−1 and ∆Credit 
/(commit+Asset) =(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡-(committed credit lines+loans)𝑡−1/(committed credit 
lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 are dependent variables. CAPITAL_ASSET= capital/ assets𝑡−1 , COMMIT= 
committed credit lines/(committed credit lines+Total assets)𝑡−1 , DEPOSIT_ASSET= Total customer 
deposit/ assets𝑡−1 , ILLIQUIDASSETS= Net loans/ Total assets𝑡−1 , LOGASSETS= Natural Logarithm 
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of total assets. GDP, Inflation and Unemployment are taken from World Bank website. P-values are 
reported in the parenthesis, ***, ** and * denote the coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the relationship between each asset type and the changes in amount 
of lending and credit creation before, during and after the financial crisis 2007-2009 in 
Euro zone banks. The data are gathered from the Bankscope database and contains 354 
banks from 19 Eurozone countries. This research is based on two main hypotheses. 
First, Bank deposit and bank capital, both have positive relationship with bank lending 
during financial crisis. Second, Bank capital has a positive association with bank credit 
creation during financial crisis. The results provide proof for both hypotheses. This 
research provides evidence that core deposits and capital act as a reliable source of 
financing for banks during financial turmoil. These two valuable types of asset enable 
banks to continue lending and create credits during financially distressed period. These 
results support the Cornet et al. (2011), Ivashina and Scharfstien (2010a), Kaplan and 
Minou (2013), and Disyatat (2011) findings. 
 
These findings are also a proof that those banks with higher level of core deposit and 
capital did better to overcome their liquidity risk when the liquidity is scarce. This study 
also provide evidence that large banks with higher committed credit lines could 
continue to lend more loans than other large banks with lower amount of committed 
credit lines. Furthermore, the results support Cornet et al. (2011) that liquidity risk has a 
greater influence on the large banks compare to smaller counterparts. The results also 
represent that banks with higher level of commitments have a greater loan demand and 
this finding is also a support for Cornett et al. (2011) results. 
 
In general, it seems that between the various types of assets hold by banks, deposit and 
capital can assist the banks the best when the economic situation is unstable. These 
results are the same for both US and Eurozone banks, although some assets, for example 
unused commitments, seems to has a negative effect on credit creation in US banks , but 
no significant effect has found in this study for the banks in Eurozone. 
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